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1. INTRODUCTION1 
Yugoslavia is one of the rapidly industrialising countries which has had a 
record of very high rates of economic growth over the past decades and 
which is now balancing on the brink of bankruptcy. That its grave financial 
problems have not attracted as much international attention as those of, for 
instance, Poland, Brazil or Mexico may perhaps be explained by the marginal 
position that Yugoslavia occupies between East and West, both geo-
graphically and politically. A further explanation may be that so far, the 
crisis has not given rise to major domestic political upheavals. Moreover, the 
economy is relatively small, the population of Yugoslavia being only some 22 
million. 
The unique design of the Yugoslav economy, however, makes it an 
exceptionally interesting case for analysing the causes of the crisis. On the 
one hand the bulk of Yugoslav production capacities is socialised, while on 
the other the coordination of economic activities is largely based on market 
competition between workers'-self-managed enterprises, small private firms 
and self-employed producers. There is no other socialist economy in which 
enterprises and banks have had as much autonomy as they have been given 
in Yugoslavia since the economic reforms of the mid-1960s. Worker-
controlled enterprises have been able to decide on investments, plan their 
production, borrow from banks and determine - at least in principle - their 
wage rates and sales prices. 
However, this does not mean that the economy has become entirely 
liberalised. In order to counter chronic inflationary tendencies, state agencies 
have continued to subsidise prices of certain basic commodities, and most of 
the time they have also applied general ceilings on price and wage increases. 
In the course of the 1970s market competition was moderated through a 
system of 'self-management agreements' (on commodity prices, transactions 
etc.) between enterprises, and through 'social compacts' (on wage rates, 
social-security schemes etc.). The latter are co-signed by enterprises, trade 
unions and the commune, republic or federal governments. These social 
compacts also determine the contributions which the workers make from 
their incomes to finance social and economic infrastructural facilities 
and services.2 
Because the autonomy of the market sector has been constitutionally. 
guaranteed, planning can only be 'indicative'. Yearly 'resolutions', medium-
(Le. five-year) and long-term plans specify investment priorities, targets for 
productive employment etc. These resolutions are based on the plans made 
by enterprises and the various branches and sectors of the economy. The 
enterprises can deviate from these plans, and in fact they have done so on a 
large scale, despite a growing number of disincentives such as credit 
squeezes on low-priority investments.3 
International trade also has been greatly liberalised by the economic 
reforms of the mid-1960s. This was done to force Yugoslav firms to compete 
with foreign producers on the local and international markets. As a result the 
economic role of the state has become quite comparable to that of the 
governments in Western capitalist welfare states. The one major exceptional 
aspect of the Yugoslav economy is that the income earned in the socialised 
sector (which comprises the autonomous work collectives that produce using 
socialised capital) is far greater than that in the private sector (which 
comprises the self-employed citizens and private enterprises with a maximum 
of five salaried workers and produces using private capital). This is clearly 
shown by the statistics presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. The Percentage of Gross Income Earned in the Various Industries in the 
Socialised Sector in Yugoslavia, 1980 
Industry 
Mining, processing industries and manufacturing 
Trade and banking 
Traffic and communications 
Tourism and catering 
Construction 
Crafts 
Agriculture, fisheries and forestry 
All industries taken together 
% 
100 
99 
93 
86 
84 
48 
24 
87 
Source: Stalisticki Godisnjak Jugoslavije, 1981 (Savezni zavod za Statistiku SFRJ, 
Beograd). 
Such.a politico-economic structure leads one to expect that Yugoslavia 
would be in a favourable position to avoid the inefficiencies of economic 
centralism, with its virtually inevitable bureaucratic rigidities. These rigidities 
mar rational economic behaviour at all levels, right down to and including the 
individual enterprise. At the same time one would expect such a structure to 
also prevent the economic wastage which characterises capitalist industrial 
development, with its inherent antagonisms and contradictions, anarchy of 
the market and periodic crises. 
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Such was, indeed, the expectation - if not conviction - expressed in official 
and unofficial statements made by Yugoslav social scientists, planners and 
politicians during the 1960s and early 1970s. At that time the growth rate of the 
Yugoslav economy ranked among the highest in the world, and the real 
consumption of the Yugoslav people (excluding the social services, which 
were also rapidly expanding) almost doubled, while unemployment remained 
low. 
The fact that during this time, the number of Yugoslav workers employed 
abroad - mostly in Western Europe - rose to around one million (some 11 per 
cent of the economically active population in 1975) was not generally viewed 
as a negative development. Their wage remittances to Yugoslavia constituted 
a very substantial and very welcome inflow of hard currency. This rose from 
an annual equivalent of US$1.1 billion in 1972 to that of US$2.1 billion in 1977. 
Together with the earnings in foreign currency from tourism, which rose from 
an annual equivalent of US$0.5 billion in 1972 to that of US$0.9 billion in 1977, 
these remittances helped the country rather successfully to maintain a 
balance in international payments until 1976, despite persistently high 
foreign-trade deficits.4 
2. GROWING IMBALANCES AND THE FIRST SIGNS OF CRISIS 
The euphoria that surrounded Yugoslavia's impressive post-reform industrial 
expansion, which was fostered by Keynesian economic insights just as it was 
in the West, gradually faded when commodity markets showed ever-
increasing imbalances in the mid-1970s. In several branches (for example the 
automobile industry) unsold stocks and overcapacities became an 
increasingly heavy financial burden on enterprises. Unemployment steadily 
grew, albeit largely because there were fewer employment opportunities for 
Yugoslav workers abroad. 
At first official optimism persisted, however. Thus far measures calling for 
'economic stabilisation' (one of the main slogans of the decade) had indeed 
been effective in keeping inflation down to 12-15 per cent, which was a 
significant improvement over earlier inflation rates of around 20 per cent. 
Now that the symptoms of recession were making themselves felt, the ceilings 
on wage arid price increases and measures to prevent collective expendi-
tures from expanding faster than real economic growth were combined with 
new stimuli for the industrial sector. In the years from 1976 to 1979 banks 
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were encouraged to give fresh credit to enterprises with liquidity problems (in 
order to accelerate sales of stocks at frozen prices, among other things), 
while new investments were stimulated by relaxing credit restrictions en-
suing from the priorities set in the current five-year plan. In 1979 n-ominal 
interest rates on medium" and long-term loans to enterprises - which, at 9 
per cent, were already far below the inflation rate - were brought down 
further to levels between 6.5 and 6.9 per cent.5 In the meantime invest-
ments in economic infrastructure by the' federal government and the 
~overnments of the republics and communes continued to rise not only in 
absolute. terms but also in proportion to GNP (see Table 2). 
Through these measures the investment rate in Yugoslavia, which was still 
high, was boosted even further. Apparently this was believed to be the best 
strategy to solve simultaneously the problems of rising unemployment, 
illiquidity and inflation. An even more modernised industrial sector was 
thought to be able to increase efficiency and reduce production costs. This 
was expected to increase sales on the domestic and foreign markets, and so 
to give the economy a fresh impulse.6 
The confidence in this strategy proved to be unrealistic, and the Yugoslav 
version of supply-side economics had dramatic consequences. These were 
as follows: 
- Yugoslavia's foreign-trade deficit tripled between 1975 and 1979 to more 
than US$7 billion. 
- Inflation (measured on the basis of the cost of living) more than doubled 
during 1979-80, until it reached a peak of 45-50 per cent per annum in the 
early months of 1981 J 
- Total employment continued to increase by 3-4 per centper annum at first, 
and then by 1-2 per cent, but the number of people seeking employment 
grew much faster (5-6 per cent per annum) and rose to close to 900,000 (or 
about 10 per cent of the economically active population) in 1982.8 
- The volume of industrial production grew from 1977 to 1979 in accordance 
with the planned objectives, expanding by about 8-9 per cent per annum, 
but after that it fell sharply. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the recent trends in the economy shown by some 
important social and economic indicators. 
The deplorable financial position of the country forced the federal 
government to take severe austerity measures. During 1980, 1981 and 1982 
net real incomes in the socialised sector were allowed to drop by an average 
of 16 per cent, and those of workers and personnel employed in government 
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Table 2. Some Important Statistical and Financial Indicators of Yugoslavia's Socio-
economic Development, 1966-82 
Indicator 1966-75 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
% net real-income 5.3** 4.5 3.3 5.3 -0.1 -7.5 -5.0 -1.0 
growth of average 
worker (in the 
socialised sector) 
% inflation (based 22.4** 11.6 15.0 14.3 20.4 30.3 41* 32' 
on the cost of 
living) 
Total employment 3.6-4.8 4.9 5.1 5.4 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.0 
(in mlns) excl. 
the self-employed 
Persons seeking 268 -540 665 717 738 775 789 833 888 
employment (av. 
x 1,000) 
Unemployed re- 81 -145 177 161 167 181 248 287 317 
ceiving social 
allowances (av. 
x 1,000) 
% of growth in 7.1** 3.2 9.9 8.4 7.7 4.6 3.9 0.1 
volume of indus-
trial production 
Gross fixed invest-
ments as % of GNP 
a. productive 21.7 24.7 26.7 28.9 27.4 29.4 263 } 
enterprises 29.8* 
b. socio-economic 4.8 5.7 5.8 6.5 6.7 6.3 5.1 
infrastructure 
(excl. private 
housing) 
Value of exports 2,167** 4,878 5,256 5,668 6,794 8,976 10,233 10,238 
(in mlns US$) 
Foreign balance -1,463** -2,489 -4,380 -4,317 -7,225 -6,087 -4,828 -2,693 
of trade (in mlns 
US$) 
Balance of pay- -375** +165 -1,582 -1,256 -3,661 -2,291 -750 +1,200 
ments (in mlns 
US$) 
US$/Yugoslav 12.5 -18.0 '18.2 18.4 18.6 19.1 29.3 37,8 48.0 
dinar parity (av.) 
* These figures are approximations. 
*' These figures are annual averages. 
Sources: The figures fO(1976-80 are compiled from SGJ, 1974-81. The figures for 
1981-82 are compiled from INDEKS Mesecne Pregled Privredne Statistike ... 
(see footnote 9). 
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administration and collective services dropped by more than 20 per cent. This 
helped to decrease inflation to about 32 per cent in 1982.9 Imports of 
consumer goods and of raw materials to produce these were curtailed, and 
this caused sharply felt shortages of gasoline, coffee, sugar, vegetable oils, 
soaps and synthetic detergents, among other things. Exports of domestic-
ally produced commodities were forced to increase, so that some of them 
were soon in short supply on the local markets. The main instrument was a 
series of drastic devaluations of the dinar: by the end of 1982 the dinar's US$ 
parity was 30 per cent of what it was in 1978. 
These measures have considerably eased Yugoslavia's monetary pre-
dicament: the foreign-trade deficit was reduced to the level of the early 
1970s, and in 1982, for the first time in six years, the international balance of 
payments became positive (see Table 2). 
These quick achievements are remarkable, but the country and its people 
are paying a high price for them. What causes concern, more than anything 
else, is the stagnation in industrial growth which has developed even though 
the rate of fixed investments has remained very high. 
3. THE STAKES ARE HIGH, BUT WHERE SHOULD THE BLAME BE PUT? 
The political, ideological and scholarly debate in Yugoslavia about the 
numerous problems arising from rapid industrial growth, from technological 
progress and innovation and from the transformation of the labour force 
during the process of change from predominantly rural to urban employ-
ment, has always been quite intense. This has been the case especially 
since the liberalisation in the early 1960s, and the subsequent efforts 
towards liberalisation through institutional reforms based on quite radical 
constitutional alterations. These reforms were intended to establish more 
effective workers' control over the entire economy (including the planning 
process, the banking system and the public and social-servicesectors).1o 
They were expected to have a stabilising effect on the economy, but infla-
tion, serious money-supply problems (with spells of embarrassing illiquidity 
in entire economic sectors) and chronically high foreign-trade deficits con-
tinued to plague planners and decision-makers at all levels. 
Nevertheless official documents time and again restated an unshakable 
confidence in the self-managed, decentralised economy and its capacity to 
learn from experience and ultimately to succeed in creating a harmonious, 
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prosperous and modern socialist nation.11 In other words the ideological and 
political stakes in making steady progress in that direction were - and still are 
- high. It is therefore not surprising that in the past few years, the grave 
disequilibrium in economic relations within the country, as well as with its 
foreign business partners, gave an unusually urgent, and at times even 
desperate, quality to the public discussion about Yugoslavia's economic 
prospects. . 
In that discussion the factors which were most frequently emphasised as 
being responsible for Yugoslavia's present situation are the following: 
External factors 
1. The world economic recession. - This came at the critical period for 
Yugoslavia, when the country had to reap the fruits of its high investments 
in export-oriented industrial and agro-industrial capacities. The gradual 
stagnation in the growth of revenues from exports to EEC countries and the 
United States, which was partly due to tariff restrictions, was especially 
sharply felt. The recession also resulted in the repatriation of some 330,000 
migrant workers between 1973 and 1982, mainly from Western Europe. 
This caused a decrease in foreign-currency remittances on the one hand; 
on the other hand an urgent need arose to create new jobs at a much faster 
pace than was originally foreseen as necessary. 
2. The oil-price increases in 1973 and 1979. - These made Yugoslavia's 
import bill for oil, oil products and natural gas rise to more than US$3 billion 
in 1980. This figure was 23.3 per cent of total imports, whereas it had been 
a mere 5.5 per cent in 1972.12 
3. The rises in interest rates on foreign debts. - Because of these, Yugoslavia 
became burdened with an additional annual bill of an estimated US$OA-
0.5 billion in 1980, 1981 and 1982.13 
Internal factors 
1. Economic losses due to human failings. - These included poor manage-
ment of enterprises, a lack of motivation and of commitment to elementary 
principles of efficiency among the workers etc. Some critics pointed out the 
lack - or inadequacy - of economic sanctions that in other economies 
effectively limit mismanagement and inefficiency.14 
2. Costly mistakes made in an over-complicated planning mechanism. -
Bureaucracy and technocracy have also been seen as damaging to the 
development of self-management relations within and between enter-
prises, and especially between enterprises and banks.15 
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3. Certain monopolistic and oligopolistic tendencies in the economy. - Large 
firms and industrial conglomerates sometimes gained undue influ-
ence on investment planning and credit policies at the level of the 
republics and communes. From the early 1970s onwards the banks in 
particular were almost constantly attacked by the press and the political 
fora for not being able to sufficiently resist pressures from those 'mem-
ber-founders' which were well established, powerful and credit-hungry. 
The negative consequences of this were widely felt: credit for smaller, 
local firms and for new economic initiatives became increasingly scarce.16 
4. Certain state interventions in the price mechanism. - Some price controls 
were too sudden and drastic and had disastrous effects on returns on 
investments in certain production lines and even entire industrial sectors. 
(The interventions intended to control the prices of steel and other raw 
materials are examples of this.) However, it was sometimes argued that 
quite the reverse was the case, i.e. that in order to ensure economic 
stabilisation the state had to exert much stricter controls on prices, 
including those set among enterprises on the basis of self-management 
agreements. 
5. 'Political investments', to use the term common among the Yugoslavs 
themselves. - This term refers to investments made more on the basis of 
political considerations than on economic ones.17 Such investments were 
most often ascribed to rivalries between republics, as each republic 
wanted its own steelworks, car factory, petro-chemical complex, rail-
connected seaport, etc. This rivalry paralleled what was and is happening 
allover the world: each major town or provincial capital wants its own ultra-
modern hospital, stadium, concert hall, theatre or other kind of centre. 
Obviously in a federation of republics such as Yugoslavia, it is not easy to 
effectively counter such tendencies without evoking historically based 
suspicions of an attitude of superiority - if not outright discrimination - on 
the part of larger, richer and more developed regions. Such discrimination 
had prevented less prominent regions from playing any significant role in 
pre-war Yugoslavia. 
However, there were also cases where the economic wisdom of costly 
investment projects was questioned even within a particular republic, but 
these projects were realised nevertheless due to pressure from locally 
influential circles. Some of these projects turned out to be grave mistakes 
and had to be abandoned, since no further financial resources could be 
made available to rescue them.1B 
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There can be no doubt whatsoever that these phenomena have contributed, 
to a greater or lesser extent, to Yugoslavia's present problems. Howeverthey 
.. do not, in my opinion, explain the crisis. As far as the e~ternal economic 
constraints are concerned, these pose equally serious problems to other 
rapidly industrialising countries with open economies. Some of these 
economies have suffered from destabilisation, albeit not as acute as that of 
Yugoslavia today. In that respect it is highly relevant to note that even a 
decade before the world economic recession in the late 1970s, Yugoslavia 
had the highest inflation rate of all rapidly industrialising nations except Israel 
and some Latin American countries.19 
As far as the alleged internal causes of Yugoslavia's economic problems 
are concerned, in my view they must be considered as falling within the 
normal range of the imperfections and inefficiencies inherent in any politico-
economic system. 
The prime symptom of destabilisation, which is accelerating inflation, by 
definition points to growing overspending. Economies may be abfe to put up 
with that, as in fact the Yugoslav economy did until the mid-1970s, as long as 
the overspending is mainly on the consumption side. If consume.r demand 
is too high a wage-price spiral evolves, and this merely reflects self-
defeating social pressure to push consumption beyond the level that the 
economy can bear. When, under such circumstances, the investment rate is 
not too high, productivity grows quickly, while capacity is fully used, so that 
there is little or no unemployment. In such situations profits are, typically, 
satisfactory; cash flows are positive and stocks minimal. 
In Yugoslavia, however, the characteristics which the situation acquired 
were preci&.ely the reverse. Real net consumer spending, which ever since 
1971 had lagged slightly behind the growth of productivity, stagnated and 
even decreased when inflation rose to around 40 per cent in 1980. The rate of 
capacity use declined in several branches of industry, and the overall growth 
in productivity fell sharply, as was explained above. The increase in stocks on 
unsold goods rendered many enterprises dangerously illiquid.~o 
This combination of characteristics indicates that at least one important 
cal!se of overspending, if not the main one, must be soughf in the realm of 
production. The following considerations support this view. 
1. It cannot be convincingly argued that Yugoslav enterprises are 
exceptionally inefficient in using their production equipment (once 
installed), labour power, energy and other inputs. 
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2. The share in gross national income of investments in public goods and in 
infrastructural facilities is high, when compared to international levels, but it 
is not high when compared to the Yugoslav rate of industrial expansion and 
transformation. (The volume of gross investments in fixed assets in the 
productive sector is a good indicator of the latter rate.)21 
3. The share in GNP of investments in fixed assets in the productive sector 
was one of the highest in the world for a period of more than twenty years. 
This share was matched only by Japan.22 
4. Over the years from 1976 to 1979, when there was a marked fall in 
investments in Japan, as in other industrial nations, the Yugoslav rate of 
capital formation in economic enterprises rose to (post-war) record levels, 
averaging 25.6 per cent of its gross material product. Thereafter 
destabilisation symptoms assumed alarming proportions.23 
These points provide ample empirical evidence to conclude that the main 
cause of overspending is indeed in the sphere of accumulation and 
amortisation of capital goods in the productive sector. Such overspending 
necessitates proportionally high complementary investments in the public 
sector, Le. investments for ancillary services and infrastructure. Furthermore it 
provides a satisfactory explanation for the emergence of overcapacities in 
most sectors of the economy and for Yugoslavia's growing inability to finance 
a sufficiently large share of its investments from cjomestic savings.24 
The latter development became Yugoslavia's 'Achilles heel' in the given 
circumstances. Foreign-exchange deficjts accumulated so fast that the 
country is now facing severe problems in meeting its international financial 
obligations. Yugoslavia's total hard-currency debt reached a figure close to 
US$20 billion in 1981, while it was a mere US$1.2 billion in 1965. In 1980 the 
country's foreign-debt servicing (Le. repayments of principal and interest) 
required an amount equal to about 45 per cent of the current foreign 
earnings.25 Only new foreign credit - from the IMF, among other sources -
could keep the burden of this servicing within manageable limits. 
Overinvestments in the Yugoslav economy might be ascribed to the 
cumulative effects of numerous incidental cases of irrational investments 
resulting from a variety of mistakes, incompetences, inappropriate regionalist 
influences and the like. Rather than doing this, however, it appears more 
promising to consider, in the next section, whether factors can be identified 
that caused systematic distortions of decisions on economic investments, 
whenever and wherever they were being taken. 
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4. INSTITUTIONALISED UNDERPRICING OF INVESTMENTS: 
A MAJOR DESTABILISING FORCE 
A striking aspect of the Yugoslav economic system has, since the economic 
reform~ of the mid-1960s, been that the interest rates at which banks 
extended credit to firms for financing investments have consistently been low. 
Despite inflation rates fluctuating between 12 and 20 per cent throughout the 
1970s and climbing to around 40 per cent"in 1980 and 1981, medium- and 
long-term loans could be contracted at nominal interest rates of 8-9 per cent 
on the average. In 1979 and 1980 these rates even !ell to less than 7 per cent. 
Authoritative sources, some of which are mentioned below, have repeatedly 
pointed out this anomaly. 
Branko Horvat, perhaps Yugoslavia's most reputed economist both 
nationally and internationally, was one of the first to make such observations. 
As early as the late 1960s he emphasised that excessively low real interest 
rates had a destabilising effect in the absence of balancing mechanisms 
which could create a capital market that would function properly.2B More 
recently this has become a key point in analyses of economic developments 
in Yugoslavia, as the following f.our examples show. 
1. Jaroslav Vanek, an economist of Czech orig,in who is well known from his 
theoretical work on the economics of the self-managed firm, has over the 
years become ,a specialist on Yugoslavia's socialist market economy. In 
an article first published in 1973 he wrote that 'the subjectively low cost of 
capital is bound to produce, for those who have capital [i.e. existing firms] 
unnaturally high capital-labour ratios.' He went on to say that where 
equality of personal incomes.is promoted through regulations which force 
enterpris,8s with higher incomes to accumulate more, '[this] will lead [in 
those enterprises] to ever higher and more capital intensive 
accumulations, and thus in a never ending cumulative process, the rich 
enterprises will grow richer, the poor ones and the unemployed will be left 
behind'.27 
What Vanek sketched is a highly unstable industrialisation process in 
which Yugoslav policy-makers were forced to choose either to accept 
slow growth with rapidly rising unemployment or to opt for a grossly 
overcapitalised, fast-growing but no less inefficient economy at the price of 
high inflation. After Vanek wrote this in 1973, actual developments 
unfortunately proved his prediction to be very correct. The statistics also 
show that a choice was made for growth with high inflation. 
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To enhance efficiency in the use of capital through improved 
distribution of investment funds, Vanek proposed a flat real interest rate on 
investment credit and savings deposits of 12-15 per cent. He developed 
strong arguments to demonstrate that this would enable stable industrial 
growth with full employment at a much more modest volume of 
investments (which would yield savings on capital). Apart from that, such 
an interest rate would create incomparably better conditions for effective 
workers' self-management at the enterprise level.2B 
2. The report prepared in 1975 by a World Bank mission to Yugoslavia 
described the-aistorting influences of the structure of negative or low 
interest rates as follows: 
(i) it fuels excessive investment demand, making-control of inflation more difficult; 
(ii) it encourages waste of capital in all its uses ... in utilising existing capacities 
and in choosing replacement rates; 
(iii) it affects adversely the quantity and quality of financial savings and invest-
ments ... ; 
(iv) by implicitly relying on nonprice rationing of credit, it creates scope for arbitrary 
intervention by political bodies in enterprise credit allocations.29 
3. Th e OEeD's Economic Survey: Yugoslavia, published in May 1981, 
discussed the issue of what it called 'the low and inflexible real interest rate 
policy' in a similar vein. It concluded that 'it has encouraged an excessive 
level of stock building and fixed investment'.3o Earlier in the report it is 
stated that 'The sizeable negative real rates are an important inducement 
to borrow and undermine both the short-run stabilisation objectives and 
the long run aim of promoting more efficient investment and growth.'31 
4. I n the same year Kosta Mihailovi6 published a remarkable book entitled 
E k onomska stvarnost Jugos/avije [The Economic Reality of Yugoslavia ].32 
The author has for many years been acknowledged as a prominent 
a uthority on regional development, but this book deals mainly with long-
term overall economic development in Yugoslavia and the causes of the 
p resent crisis. It was intended for a wider public and was quite successful 
in reaching it: the second edition, published in 1982, sold as quickly as 
the first one. Mihailovi6's work will be discussed extensively here not 
only because it presents a recent review of Yugoslavia's economic prob-
lems by a highly competent economist from the country itself, but espe-
c i ally because it is, in my opinion, a work of great analytical quality that 
9 aes right to the heart of the matter. 
The thrust of Mihailovi6's argument is directed at the nature and speed 
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of the accumulation and turn-over of productive capital, this being 'the key 
question in the development of any economy'. The poor functioning of the 
financial market is considered 'the major weakness of the Yugoslav 
monetary system'.33 However, it connects the issue of overly capital-
intensive development (or, to translate Milhailovi6's own words, 'the 
maximisation of income per [employed] worker as the basic motive for 
economising enterprises, which boosts the individual, and not the 
aggregate productivity of the labour force') not only to the severe 
underpricing of investment credit (to less than 30 per cent of its real 
value34), but also to '[the] bias ... created by secondary income distri-
bution, which has linked the contributions for collective and general con-
sumption [Le. taxes for infrastructural expenditures - W.B.] to the [use 
of the] labour force, as a consequence of which the latter has become 
unwarrantedly expensive'.35 The institutionally determined distortion of 
factor costs - Le. making the scarce factor (capital) cheap and the 
abundantly available factor (labour) expensive - has been 'the prime 
cause of the high proportion of investments in the national product, the low 
efficiency of investments and the rapid growth in [the number of] 
unemployed citizens'.36 
Milhailovi6 traces these grave symptoms of destabilisation in the 
Yugoslav economy, which 'fosters wastage in the entire society',37 to an 
ideologically inspired faith in, if not obsession with, rapid development on 
the basis of the capital intensification of production. What has happened is 
that through exorbitant social costs and, eventually, a decrease in 
aggregate income through rising unemployment, the economy was 
pushed over the brink into crisis. 
Milhailovi6 concludes that a revision of the country's fiscal and 
monetary policy is necessary in order that the economic costs of using 
the basic means of production will, by and large, be reflected in their prices. 
Thus he advocates a drastic increase in the interest rate on investment 
credit, to a level higher than the inflation rate(!), and a fiscal reform which 
lowers taxes and levies on wage payments, combined with the re-
introduction of a rental levy on the use of socially owned 'basic means' (Le. 
capital assets).38 A monetary and fiscal reform along these lines is not 
merely one of several instruments to achieve economic stabilisation: it is 
the decisive one and has a very broad impact on economic relations.39 
Mihailovi6 presents his proposals as an attempt to achieve a workable 
synthesis between the market economy and the planned economy, while 
avoiding the weaknesses and dangers of both. He writes: 
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It is, probably, the most important aim of the proposed complex of measures that 
they induce economic subjects to behave as the social optimum requires .... 
They will not diminish the regulatory role of the market in economic relations . 
. _Dn. the contrary, the market will be left to regulate those relationships which it 
is able to regulate.40 
It evidently is Mihailovic's purpose to provide the economic actors with the 
right signals to guide their entrepreneurial efforts.41 
However, the implications go far beyond the creation of superior 
economic steering mechanisms in the technical sense and reach into the 
realm of ideological objectives. Mihailovi6, like Vanek, is well aware of that. 
On the last page of his book he states that the reforms which would achieve 
a 'liberation from the tutelage of territorial political centres' are not only 'a 
condition for greater efficiency in the economy, but also for further 
development of self-management relations [in society]'.42 
This approach is very much in line with official Yugoslav ideology, 
which has always emphasised 'de-etatisation' as a major objective and 
consequence of workers' self-management of the economy and society.43 
It has, moreover, not only been Marxian thought which ,provided good 
'objective' reasons to argue that there is a link between economic progress 
and human liberation. It is true not only in Yugoslavia but also in many other 
countries that few forces are a greater obstacle to effective democratic 
and self-management relations than economic inefficiencies. These 
inefficiencies result in and are caused by a high and/or rising un-
employment rate, coupled with low and/or declining real incomes of 
employed workers and of the population as a whole. 
5. CONCLUSION: A LESSON FOR INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM? 
The Yugoslav and foreign analysts who have looked for 'systemic', as 
opposed to so-called 'accidental', causes of the present crisis in the Yugoslav 
economy have undoubtedly proved to be on the right track. They have 
identified powerful distorting forces that are built into the Yugoslav legal and 
institutional framework and that determine the conditions under which the 
Yugoslav market operates. 
Surely certain external circumstances of an accidental nature have had a 
.share in destabilising the Yugoslav economy. Examples of these are the oil-
price increases in 1973 and 1979 and the negative effects of the world 
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economic recession on exports to Western Europe and the Americas in 
particular. Even if allowance is made for these circumstances, however, an 
explanation is still needed for why fhey have put the Yugoslav economy so 
much more out of balance than other market economies. 
This paper is not the appropriate place for trying to establish whether the 
markets for capital, labour and commodities in Yugoslavia were liberalised too 
much or too little from the viewpoint of maximising the benefits of their intrinsic 
self-regulatory and stabilising potential. It is not the degree of institutional 
control over - or interference with - market processes that seems a very 
promising issue for evaluation. Indeed in all industrial market economies, 
governments constantly interfere with markets through their monetary and 
fiscal system, trade regulations and agreements and their policies for wage 
and price setting. In so doing they co-determine the direction and outcome of 
the economic process. This in no way contradicts the principle of market 
competition among autonomous (private or collective) economic enterprises: 
there are no games without rules, and a 'free for all' is not a game. 
Bad rules, however, spoil any game. That is a matter of the direction in 
which various institutionally and politically determined regulations move or 
guide markets, and that direction can be established with much more 
certainty than the degree of the impact. 
In this perspective the rather extreme case of economic disequilibrium in 
Yugoslavia gains an interesting dimension which gives it a far more general 
relevance. This is because Yugoslavia's monetary policies, primarily aimed at 
giving enterprises easy access to cheap credit (extended by banks operating 
along lines very similar to those of commercial banks anywhere else in the 
world), do not differ essentially from those prevalent in capitalist market 
economies. Its fiscal system, which finances 80-90 per cent of the collective 
expenditures through levies on wages, personal incomes and consumer's 
purchases, also does not differ essentially. The approach in the field of 
income policies has been the same, basically Keynesian, strategy as was 
followed by the capitalist economies during the economic boom. Under that 
strategy net wages - i.e. wages less taxes and social premiums - were 
allowed to rise at the same pace as the overall growth of the gross material 
product. This meant that, as in other rapidly growing industrial countries, 
almost the entire fiscal burden on personal incomes and consumer 
expenditures was passed on to the wage bill of enterprises, with the result that 
the rise in the price of labour became way out of proportion. 
That the Yugoslav institutional policy is fundamentally identical to that of 
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the capitalist economies is, of course, not a coincidence. The very successful 
and rapid industrial growth in the West during the 1950s and 1960s was taken 
as a model, both theoretically and practically, for Yugoslavia's capital-
intensive course of development. In fact for more than ten years after the mid-
1960s the Yugoslav economy achieved even greater capital accumulation 
and growth in real consumer's income than most other industrial nations -
albeit with more quickly rising public (mostly foreign) debts and inflation. 
There are indeed many indications that Yugoslavia's economic policy-
makers simply 'overdid' it in their strategy of capital-intensity-biased 
stimulation, and that they overheated the system to such a degree that the 
costs began to outweigh the benefits. The economy came to operate with 
growing wastage of its physical and human resources. 
The question now arises of what was - and still is - happening to 
international industrial capitalism at this time? In recent years it t60 has 
proven ever more clearly to be inherently prone to crisis. This has cruelly 
smashed the optimistic expectations to the contrary, which had developed 
during the decades of economic boom. It is true that the phase of almost 
uninterrupted expansion in industrial capitalism after the Second World War 
lasted about twice as long as Yugoslavia's prosperity under a similar 
economic strategy, but twenty-five years of relatively stable economic growth 
cannot by any stretch of the historical imagination be a reason to label it 'long 
lived'! The symptoms of economic destabilisation in Western industrial 
capitalism may not - as yet - be as acute as they are in Yugoslavia, but 
qualitatively they are not different: the common symptoms are dwindling 
profits and/or growing losses in the market sector, high and increasing 
unemployment rates and stagnating growth in productivity and in demand. 
Other symptoms depend on the style of crisis management chosen by the 
polity: one sees either rapidly growing public deficits and inflation, with no 
decline in the gross national product or only a slow one, or drastic cuts in 
public expenditures causing the downward production trend to accelerate. 
Western analysts of Yugoslavia's economic problems have for many 
years been very keen on revealing the institutionally determined distortion of 
relative factor costs, but now it seems that it would be wise for them to turn 
their attention to that same phenomenon in their own capitalist market 
economies. This is perhaps not so much because of low interest rates on 
investment credits, even though one should keep in mind that the much-
discussed sharp rise in real interest rates to 5-7 per cent or more is a very 
recent development. Before 1978 and throughout the build-up of the crisis, 
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real interest rates of 0-3 per cent were quite normal among the industrial 
nations in the West. 
There is, however, every good reason to take a critical look at the Western 
capitalist fiscal systems which are currently applied, as they have grown over 
time. In all Western industrial countries without exception, the tax burden 
weighs heavily on labour (Le. personal incomes and consumption), while 
investments in capital assets are subsidised through public funding or are 
fiscally stimulated in other ways. It is a fact that 55-60 per cent of the gross 
national income, and in some countries even more, is channelled through the 
public sector. At the same time a large share of the public expenditures are 
intended to directly support, or are a direct consequence of, the investment 
and transformation process in the market sector. These conditions make it 
evident beyond any doubt how strongly such a one-sided linkage of taxes and 
premiums to the employment of labour, rather than to capital, favours the latter 
at the expense of the former. 
In this connection it is interesting to note a short comment in the 
conclusions to the World Bank's 1975 report on Yugoslavia: 'the distortive 
effects of a large body of proportional taxes on personal incomes has been 
recognised' .44 Nevertheless this second source of the upward price distortion 
of labour as compared to capital (i.e. investments), which is probably of no 
less economic significance than low or even negative interest rates on 
investment credit, is hardly ever mentioned in analyses of the causes of 
unbalanced capital formation, inflation and unemployment in Yugoslavia (and 
in other rapidly developing nations). One reason why this is so is now perhaps 
clear. The fiscal systems in the leading industrial countries in Europe and 
North America are in that respect equally if not more sharply biased than the 
Yugoslav system. 
There may be another factor explaining why that bias has thus far been 
given so little attention in the debate on structural imbalances in Western 
industrial development. Logically speaking a correction would require that the 
capital stock of enterprises in the market sector would be taxed in one way or 
the other. Alternatively one might consider taxing additions to that capital 
stock in the form of new investments. Even if the vast majority of economists 
were not so dogmatic as to reject such a line of thought offhandedly, 
considering it a dangerous heresy to be erased from the slate of policy options 
as quickly as possible, in all likeliness it represents a departure from current 
thinking that is too sharp to be seriously considered. Taking such a measure 
would indeed entail a major break with widely acclaimed policies seeking to 
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achieve the ideal of rapid technological and economic progress. 
Given the ever more serious and apparently insoluble economic problems 
in the West, the part of the world which used to serve as a model for success-
ful economic expansion, perhaps the suitable time has now come for a 
more sober interpretation of the history of Western capitalism in the colo-
nial and neo-colonial periods. As a consequence greater willingness may 
develop to consider major deviations from standard capitalist economic 
thought and practice.45 More credit should go to those who, like Kosta 
Mihailovi6, have the courage to challenge conventional ideas about eco-
nomic development regardless of how strong the support for them still is 
among liberal, Keynesian or socialist colleagues. 
Indeed it is not ideological differerences, as they are commonly 
understood, that seem to be decisive at the present moment, nor questions of 
economic orthodoxy or heresy for that matter. It is first of all necessary to 
(re)gain a more firm theoretical footing, now that experience has shown so 
many economic beliefs and convictions to be little mo~e than myths, some of 
which have had quite disastrous consequences. Rather than abandoning 
existing economic theory - a solution for which some defeatists might argue-
(re)gaining that theoretical footing means relinking theory to some of its 
almost forgotten roots. Coming back to the central theme of this analysis, in 
any market theory the notion of 'the right price' is very classic and very 
orthodox. In this perspective the 'unorthodox' idea of correcting the price of 
using capital by taxing capital investments to the extent that they increase the 
costs for the (public sector of the) economy can hardly be called heretical. 
Why are all the external costs of production added to the price of employing 
labour and none of them to the use of capital? Even worse, why is the use of 
capital subsidised with funds raised by additional taxes on labour? 
The latter practice is not consistent with elementary economic logic. 
Possibly this is because it was inspired by an unfaltering faith in technological 
progress at all costs, which dates from the nineteenth century. Moreover, we 
may have hit here upon an issue which should help in identifying a criterion for 
distinguishing between 'capital-ist' and 'Iabour"ist' (i.e. socialist) thinking 
that nowadays has become more relevant historically than some conven-
tional criteria. 
Whatever the case may be, the question of the manner in which the 
external costs of production in the market sector are fiscally attached to factor 
employment cannot be separated from the question - which theoretically is 
equally neglected and equally fundamental- of the 'right' speed and direction 
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of technical progress. The key phenomenon which links the two is, of course, 
the substitution of capital (and non-human energy) for labour. In spite of the 
general consensus among economists that trade cycles and economic crises 
are caused by private and public overinvestments during economic booms, 
the entire institutional framework of industrial market economies - capitalist 
and socialist alike - continues to be set on stimulating physical investments in 
productive activities at all stages of the trade cycle. Bearing in mind that, as 
was mentioned above, in the wake of any rapid process of industrial growth 
and development cO.mes the need for massive investments in infrastructural 
facilities, it should not be surprising that each major industrial boom ends in a 
crisis, and that the symptoms of the crisis are aggravated rather than 
alleviated by further general investment stimuli. 
The conclusion of this analysis seems to imply that Yugoslavia, with its 
serious problems in industrial development, should be held up as a kind of 
mirror to other industrial countries struggling with economic destabilisation 
and recession. It indicates that policies designed to moderate the volume of 
investments in economic enterprises and the rate at which new production 
techniques are adopted are likely to achieve a better allocation and fuller use 
of economic resources. They would definitely improve the rate of return on 
productive investments and increase the income disposable for collective 
expenditures and consumption of the population. 
Contrary to what is commonly believed, such policies would not arrest 
technical progress, nor would they even slow it down. There are several 
reasons for this. 
1. The frontiers of technological innovation could be pushed forward as fast if 
not faster than before. The main difference would be that each new 
technique would diffuse more slowly through the industrial branches 
where it could be profitably used, while each unit of modern equipment 
installed would be kept in operation for a longer period on the average. High 
initial interest or taxes paid on the newest equipment would moderate its 
competitive margin over older vintages of production equipment, so that 
the latter would remain profitably operable during a longer part of their 
technical lifetime. 
2. The direction in which technical advancements would move would change 
somewhat. The emphasis would shift from the substitution of labour (even 
though that would continue) to other forms of rationalisation, in particular 
savings on capital, energy and other inputs. 
3. The growth and adaptation of social and economic infrastructure could be 
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attuned to a lower aggregate need for such adaptation arising in the 
productive sector. This would create scope for a relative decrease in 
public expenditures. 
Economic Steering after Keynes: a Brief Final Note 
Since governments are by far the strongest single financial as well as socio-
economic steering force in a society, they can contribute a great deal to 
realising a more balanced and cost-saving course of economic development, 
whether it be in Yugoslavia or in any other socialist or capitalist market 
economy. They can, however, only do this as long as they take full cognizance 
of the 'objective' constraints of the economy and society they control. 
Moreover, if built-in institutional mechanisms (of which policy-makers may 
not be fully aware) put heavy politico-economic pressure on constantly 
stimulating certain dynamic factors of progress exclusively, and in so doing 
implicitly discourage other equally important ones, even drastic stabilisation 
measures applied on a year-to-year basis are likely to fail, unless they begin 
by correcting the more fundamental institutional imbalances. 
It has often been said in recent years that the world desperately needs a 
'new Keynes' or, to put it in less personal terms, a new set of ideas or a new 
econof'Dic theory that can help governments to overcome the current 
international crisis. I believe that the material presented in this paper provides 
some clues as to what such a theory should be concerned with first of all: i.e. 
with the institutional and particularly fiscal and monetary checks and 
balances in the economic process. This time it is not merely a matter of 
maintaining the aggregate volume of demand at the required 'full-employment 
level' (as was Keynes' central concern), but of the proper regulation, such that 
it functions as a major balancing device, of the volume and nature of capital 
investments in new production equipment. This appears to be the additional 
instrument that is needed to curb the structural tendency to overexpand, 
which typifies so many modern industrial economies under classical 
Keynesian economic regimes. This tendency causes them to overcharge the 
social, environmental and economic 'carrying capacity' of the society. 
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